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Judicial Review of Commerce Department 
Antidumping Duty Determinations: 
Deference or Abdication? 
Kemn c. Kennedy * 
The Trade Agreements Act of 19791 and the Customs Courts 
Act of 19802 effected a sweeping overhaul of U.S. law governing in-
ternational trade.s Among the many procedural changes triggered 
by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (the Act or TAA) was the 
transfer of responsibility for conducting countervailing and an-
tidumping duty investigations from the Treasury Department to the 
Commerce Department.4 In addition, the T AA was the prime moti-
vating force for enactment of the Customs Courts Act of 1980.5 The 
Customs Courts Act, in tandem with the TAA,6 revamped wholesale 
the judicial review procedures governing international trade mat-
ters.' For example, an expanded number of "interested parties"S 
• Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. J.D. 1977, 
Wayne State University Law School; LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. The author was 
responsible for international trade litigation as a trial attorney with. the Civil Division of 
the U.S. Department of Justice. 
1 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at scattered sections oftides 5, 7, 
13, 19,26,28,31 U.S.C.). 
2 Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1771 (1980) (codified at scattered sections of tides 5, 
16, 19, 26, 28 U.S.C.). . 
S Su Symposium: A Practitioner's GuitU to International Trade Law, 6 N.CJ. brr'L L. Be 
COM. REc. 307 (1981); Barringer Be Dunn, Antidumping and Coun/mJailing Duties Investigations 
Undn- the Trade Agrennents Act of 1979, 14J. INT'L L. Be ECON. 1 (1979). 
4 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (1982); Reorg. Plan No.3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 
(1979); Exec. Order No. 12,188,45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). Su also S. REp. No. 249, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 (1979) (noting the "dismal performance" of the Treasury Depan-
ment in assessing dumping duties). 
5 Set H.R. REp. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980), reprin~d in 1980 U.S. CoDE 
CONC. Be AD. NEWS 3731. "H.R. 7540 complements Title X of the Trade Agreements Act 
of 1979, which provided for judicial review of cenain types of agency determinations prin-
cipally relating to antidumping and countervailing duty determinations." Id. 
6 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982). 
7 See H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 5, at 27-28. 
8 An "interested pany" is defined in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (I" AA or the 
Act) as (I) a foreign manufacturer, producer, or imponer of the merchandise under inves-
tigation; (2) the government of a country in which such merchandise is manufactured; (3) a 
domestic manufacturer of a product like the one under investigation; (4) a union repre-
senting workers in an industry engaged in the manufacture of such a product; and (5) a 
. trade association a majority of whose members manufactures such a product. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677(9) (1982). 
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were for the first time given access to the U.S. Court ofInternational 
Trade9 as well as to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
("CAFC" or "Federal Circuit").l0 
This article critiques three Federal Circuit decisions ll in which 
Commerce Department interpretations of the TAA's antidumping 
duty provisions were reviewed and concludes that the degree to 
which the Federal Circuit deferred to Commerce Department statu-
tory interpretations has been excessive, tantamount to abdication of 
the judicial review function. 
To better understand the significance of these decisions, a brief 
discussion of the antidumping duty law, the antidumping administra-
tive process, and the scope of judicial review of this process is 
necessary. 
I. Overview of the Antidumping Duty Law and 
the Scope of Judicial Review 
With the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, respon-
sibility for the administration of the antidumping duty (AD) law was 
transferred to the Commerce Department. 12 Commerce, acting 
through its International Trade Administration (ITA), is the "ad-
ministering authority"13 for the TAA. The raison d'etre of the AD 
law is to prevent price discrimination within national markets. 14 To 
effectuate this goal, U.S. businesses may file petitions with the ITA 
when it appears that a competing foreign manufacturer or producer 
is importing merchandise into the United States at prices which are 
less than fair value. IS If the ITA finds that foreign merchandise is 
being sold or may be sold in the United States at less than fair value, 
it will impose an additional antidumping duty subject to review by 
the U.S. International Trade Commission. 16 
The ITA calculates antidumping duties by determining the 
amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the United States 
price for the merchandise, and thus the fair value of the imported 
9 [d. § 1516a (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982). 
10 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c), (e) (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1982). See genmJUy Note, 
Judicial Review of Antidumping Casts and the Trade AgreementsAet of 1979: Towards a Unified 
System of Review, 14 J. INT'L L. & E~ON. 101 (1979). 
11 Consumer Prods. Div., SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed Am., Inc., 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985); Melamine Chems., Inc. v. United States, 732 F.2d 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Smith-
Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), etrl. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1274 
(1984). 
12 See supra note 4. 
13 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (1982). 
14 Barshefsky & Cunningham, The Prosecution of Antidumping Aetions Under the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 307, 308 (1981). 
15 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673a (1982). See also Barshefsky & Cunningham. supra note 
14, at 318-30; Barcelo, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping Afor the Tokyo Round, 
13 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 257 (1980). 
16 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982). 
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goodS. 17 Although "fair value" is not defined in the Act,18 Congress 
intended the concept of fair value to be an estimate of foreign mar-
ket value.l9 "Foreign market value" is defined as the home market 
price for the merchandise under investigation20 or, in the absence of 
home market sales, third country prices.21 "Home market price," 
the most commonly used measure of foreign market value, generally 
represents the wholesale price of imported merchandise in the for-
eign manufacturer's home market.22 U.S. price, in turn, is the U.S. 
sales price of the merchandise, computed by one of two alternative 
methods: purchase price2!1 or exporter's sale price.24 The relation-
ship between the importer and foreign manufacturer determines 
which of these methods will be used. If the merchandise is sold to ali 
unrelated importer in the United States, the "purchase price" 
formula is used.25 If, on the other hand, the sale is to a related im-
porter, the "exporter's sales price" is employed.26 
Through the use of certain price adjustments, a constructed 
value based on an arm's length transaction is derived.27 If foreign 
market value exceeds U.S. price for the merchandise in question af-
ter adjustment, an antidumping duty equal to that excess may be im-
17 [d. 
18 H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1979). "The tenn fair value is not 
defined in current law nor in the bill." [d. 
19 [d. 
20 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(I)(A) (1982). 
21 [d. § 1677b(a)(I)(B) (1982). See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 4, at 94-96. 
22 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(I)(A) (1982). 
2!1 [d. § 1677a(b). 
24 [d. § 1677a(c); su·id. § 1677(13). See also S. REp. No. 249, supra note 4, at 93-94. 
25 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 4, at 94. 
26 As explained by the Federal Circuit in Smith-Corona Group v. United States: 
United States price, as defined in section 1677a, is computed by one of 
two methods: purchase price or exporter's sales price. The antidumping law 
attempts to construct value on the basis of ann's length transactions. The 
ann's length sale takes place at different points in the chain of commerce 
depending on whether the goods traveled through a related importer or 
through an independent, unrelated importer. Thus, different methods of 
computation of United States price are required depending on the relation-
ship of the importer to the foreign producer. . 
Where the importer is an unrelated, independent pany, purchase price 
is used. Purchase price is the actual agreed-to price between the foreign pro-
ducer and the independent importer, prior to the time of importation. 
Where the importer is related, an ann's length transaction does not occur 
until the goods are resold to a retailer or to the public. In that case, "ex-
porter's sales price" is used. Exporter's sales price is the price at which the 
goods are eventually transferred in an ann's length transaction, whether 
from the importer to an independent retailer or directly to the public. 
Both purchase price and exporter's sales price are subject to adjustment 
in order to derive a "fair" United States price for comparison with foreign 
market value. The adjustments provided in section 1677a(d) are applicable 
to both purchase price and exporter's sales price. The additional adjust-
ments provided in section 1677a(e) are apphcable only to exporter's sales 
price. 
713 F.2d 1568, 1572 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original). 
27 [d. 
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posed.28 The U.S. International Trade Commission ultimately 
determines whether antidumping duties will be imposed. The Com-
mission is authorized to impose duties only if it finds that the peti-
tioning industry is being injured by reason of the less-than-fair-value 
imports.29 If the Commission either preliminarilyllo or finallylll de·-
termines that domestic industry is not suffering injury by reason of 
contested imports, or if the ITA concludes that competing merchan-
dise imports are not being sold in the United States at less than fair 
value, lI2 the case is closed at the administrative level. If, however, 
both the ITA and the Commission reach final affirmative determina-
tions, antidumping duties are imposed on the offending merchandise 
in an amount equal to the dumping margin calculated by the ITA. ss 
Affirmative AD determinations are regularly reviewed by the ITAs4 
and may eventually be revoked if the ITA is satisfied that dumping 
has ceased. S5 
Judicial review of ITA administrative determinations is expressly 
provided for in the TAA.s6 Petitioning U.S. manufacturers, import-
ers and foreign manufacturers of the subject merchandise who have 
participated in the administrative proceedings may contest either the 
ITA's or the Commission's findings and conclusionss7 by filing a 
summons and complaint with the Court of International Trade 
("CIT"). S8 The Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over all antidumping actions.S9 Subsequently, an appeal of right 
may be taken to the Federal Circuit from an adverse CIT decision.40 
The scope of judicial review of final AD determinations is statu-
. torily defined to be whether the determination is "unsupported by 
substantial evidence of the record, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law."4l It is this latter standard-"or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law"-and its application by the Federal Circuit which this 
article will examine. 
28 19 U.S.C. § 167S (1982). 
29 Id.; see Note, Injury Determinations Under the United States Antidumping Laws Bfjore and 
After the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, SS RtrrcERS L. REV. 1076, 1096 (1981); Note, An 
Analysis of "Material Injury" Under the 1979 Trade Agreements Act, 4 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo 
LJ. 87, 90 (1981). 
so 19 U.S.C. § 167Sb (1982). 
91 Id. § 167Sd(c)(2) (1982). 
921d. 
9S Id. §§ 167Sd(c)(2), 167Se(a). 
S4 Id. § 1675 .. 
95 Id. § 1675(c). 
96 Id. § 1516a. 
S7 Id. §§ 1516a(a)(I), (d); 28 U.S.C. § 26SI(c) (1982). 
98 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(l) (1982). 
99 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982). 
40 Id. § I 295(a)(5). 
41 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(I)(B) (1982). This standard is essentially that found at 5 
U.S.C. § 706 (1982). See Smith-Corona Group, 71S F.2d at 1575 n.18. 
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D. Federal Circuit Antidumping Duty Decisions 
In three recent decisions, Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. v. 
Silver Reed America, Inc. ;42 Melamine Chemicals, Inc. v. United States;4' 
and Smith-Corona Group v. United States,44 the Federal Circuit reviewed 
ITA interpretations of the antidumping duty statute. In all three 
cases, the CAFC upheld the regulations against challenges that they 
were not in accordance with law.45 
In Smith-Corona Group Smith-Corona, the last remaining domes-
tic manufacturer of portable electric typewriters,46 challenged an 
ITA antidumping duty determination47 in which several adjustments 
made to the foreign market value of Japanese typewriters48 substan-
tially reduced estimated dumping margins.49 Smith-Corona specifi-
cally challenged the validity of two regulations50 promulgated by the 
Commerce Department under the authority of section 773(a)(4)(B) 
of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the TAA.5J The first regu-
42 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
43 732 F.2d 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
44 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983). ctri. denied. 104 S. Ct. 1274 (1984). 
45 Consumer Prods. Div .• 753 F.2d at 1040; Melamine Chems .• Inc .• 732 F.2d at 935; Smith-
Corona Group. 713 F.2d at 1582. 
46 713 F.2d at 1570. 
47 Id. at 1570-71. 
48 Id. at 1573 n.12. 
49 Id. at 1571 n.4. In the case of one japanese typewriter manufacturer. the dumping 
margin was reduced from 48.7% ad valorem to 5.31 % ad valorem. For another japanese 
manufacturer. the margin was reduced from 36.53% ad valorem to 14.91 % ad valorem. 
Id. 
50 Id. 'at 1574. Smith-Corona attacked 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) and (d). 19 C.F.R. 
§ 353.15(a) and (b) (1985) sets forth specific classes of adjustments. such as advertising 
and selling expenses. and provides criteria for detennining the amount of allowances 
under 19 U.S.C. § I 677b(a)(4)(8). 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) and (d) (1985) provides in part: 
(c) Special rule. Notwithstanding the criteria for adjustments for differ-
ences in circumstances of sale set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this sec-
tion. reasonable allowances for other selling expenses generally will be made 
in cases where a reasonable allowance is made for commissions in one of the 
markets under consideration and no commission is paid in the other market 
under consideration. the amount of such allowance being limited to the ac-
tual other selling expenses incurred in the one market. or the total amount of 
the commission allowed in such other market. whichever is less. In making 
comparisons using exporter's sales price. reasonable allowance will be made 
for all actual selling expenses incurred in the home market up to the amount 
of the selling expenses incurred in the United States market. 
(d) Determination of allowances. In detennining the amount of the rea-
sonable allowances for any differences in circumstances of sale. the Secretary 
will be guided primarily by the cost of such differences to the seller. but. 
where appropriate. he may also consider the effect of such differences upon 
the market value of the merchandise. 
[d. In addition to its challenge to the regulations. Smith-Corona attacked the validity of 
the amounts of three specific adjustments to foreign market value granted the japanese 
manufacturers. See 713 F.2d at 1574-75. 
51 713 F.2d at 1574. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(8) (1982) provides: 
(4) Other adjustments 
In detennining foreign market value. if it is established to the satisfac-
tion of the administering authority that the amount of any difference between 
the United States price and the foreign market value (or that the fact that the 
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lation permitted differences in circumstances of sale to be computed 
on the basis of COSt.52 Smith-Corona argued that the regulation's 
preference for cost, rather than price or value, was inconsistent with 
the Act.5s The second regulation challenged by Smith-Corona es-
tablished an "exporter's sales price offset" (ESP),54 which permitted 
"reasonable allowances" for all actual selling expenses incurred in 
the home market up to the amount of comparable selling expenses 
incurred in the United States market.55 Because this rule effectively 
raised the U.S. price for imported typewriters, it substantially re-
duced dumping margins. 56 Smith-Corona contended that no statu-
tory support for such an adjustment existed,57 and that this 
regulatory adjustment was entirely inconsistent with the adjustments 
the T AA expressly permitted. 58 
In addressing Smith-Corona's arguments, the Federal Circuit 
stated that the contested regulations must satisfy two criteria to be 
sustained. First, they must be a proper exercise of the Secretary's 
authority. 59 Second, they must be reasonable.6o The court elabo-
rated that the reasonableness of the regulations would be deter-
mined by statutory language, legislative history, and legislative 
pUfpose.61 
With this analytical backdrop as a guide, the court reviewed 
Smith-Corona's cost-based criterion argument.62 .The court first 
considered whether the regulations were a proper exercise of agency 
authority. Although the CAFC found that the regulation lacked con-
gressional acquiescence6s and was not entitled to deferential re-
view,64 the court concluded the ITA's broad discretionary authority 
permitted it to issue the regulation.65 In addition, the CAFC held 
Id. 
United States price is the same as the foreign market value) is wholly or 
partly due to-
(B) other differences in circumstances of sale, ... 
then due allowance shall be made therefor. 
52 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(d) (1985); see supra note 50. 
5S 713 F.2d at 1574. 
54 /d. 
55 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1985); see supra note 50. 
56 713 F.2d at 1571 n.4. 
57 Id. at 1574, 1577. 
581d. 
59 Id. at 1575. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. The court found that neither the T AA's legislative history nor its purpose were 
illuminating. Set iii. at 1576. 
6S Id. 
64 The court rejected the Government's argument that heightened deference was 
necessary because the regulation was longstanding. Id. 
65 Id. at 1577. 
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that the regulation was not promulgated ultra vires because "the stat-
ute does not explicitly forbid reliance on COSt."66 Paradoxically, the 
court acknowledged that Congress has recognized the "inherent un-
reliability" of cost criteria, but nonetheless upheld the regulation.67 
Although the Federal Circuit found no support for the regula-
tion in the TAA's legislative history, it concluded that the regulation 
was reasonable. Because of the stringent statutory deadlines within 
which AD investigations and determinations must be completed, the 
court reasoned that cost data may be the only readily available, relia-
ble indicia of value, and sustained the regulation.68 
In analyzing the ESP offset, the Federal Circuit first considered 
the Government's contention that this offset was designed to redress 
a "perceived unfairness" in the calculation of foreign market value. 69 
The Act provides that specific adjustments may be made to the ex-
porter's sales price of merchandise70-the "United States price" in 
related purchaser import transactions-including downward adjust-
ment for certain "indirect costs," such as selling expenses.71 The 
ITA argued that the ESP offset regulation was necessary to counter-
balance the indirect selling cost adjustment for U.S. concerns be-
cause comparable downward adjustments were not permitted for 
foreign market indirect costS.72 Smith-Corona countered that the 
ESP offset rendered section 772(e)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930 void7s 
because it permitted two different foreign market value computa-
66 Id. As an example, the CAFC noted that pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(3) con-
structed value based on cost criteria may be used to detennine foreign market value when 
home market price or third country price are not available. Id. at 1575-76 Be n.20. The 
TAA states a preference for the use of home market price over third country price. 19 
U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(I)-(2) (1982). The legislative history of the Act shows a preference for 
the use of third country price over constructed value. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 4, at 96 
("third country prices will nonnally be preferred over constructed value if presented in a 
timely manner and if adequate to establish foreign market value. ") Id. Commerce Depart-
ment regulations likewise reflect this preference for the use of third country prices. 19 
C.F.R. § S5S.4(b) (1985). See Hemmendinger Be Barringer, TM Defense of Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Investigations Undn tM Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.CJ. INT'L L. Be 
COM. REc. 427, 4S2-S3 (1981). 
67 The court remarked: "Dumping is a prime example of unfair competition in which 
a foreign manufacturer ignores the nonnal relationship of cost to price. Hence, cost is 
subject to manipUlation and Congress has recognized its inherent unreliability." 713 F.2d 
at 1576. (emphasis added). 
68 713 F.2d at 1577 Be n.27. 
69 Id. at 1577. The ESP offset allows for adjustments to foreign market value which in 
turn reduce the dumping margin. Id. 
70 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)-(e) (1982). These adjustments include additions to ex-
porter's sales price (e.g., costs of containers and packing, rebated duties by the country of 
exportation) and subtractions from that price (e.g., export taxes or duties). Id. § 1677a(d). 
Indirect costs, such as selling expenses, may also be subtracted from the exporter's sales 
price. Id. § 1677a(e). See Smith-Corona Group, 71S F.2d at 1577-78. 
71 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(2) (1982). 
72 Smith-Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1578. As a consequence, the ITA promulgated 19 
C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1985). This regulation pennilS a comparable adjustment to foreign 
market value for selling expenses incurred in the home market. See supra note 50. 
75 Smith-Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1577. 
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tions and two different fair value comparisons to be used when the 
T AA only permits the use of one fair value. 74 
The Federal Circuit sustained the regulation, accepting the 
ITA's argument that the ESP offset was necessary to prevent the 
higher dumping margins that would otherwise result from the calcu-
lation of foreign market value in some situations.75 The CAFC 
found little guidance in the legislative history to support the ESP off-
set,76 and was forced to retreat to language of the statute itself. 77 
The court refused to accept Smith-Corona's contentions because the 
statute did not expressly foreclose the use of two different V.S. price-
foreign market value comparisons.78 The CAFC conceded that the 
regulation negated the specific statutory adjustment to exporter's 
sales price concerning selling expenses,79 but rationalized the 
agency's repeal of this statute by observing that the broader statutory 
purpose of constructing fair comparisons was realized.80 Again de-
ferring to agency discretion, the court concluded that the ESP offset 
was a proper and reasonable exercise of the agency's authority.81 
Consumer Products Division, SCM COrp.82 provides a sequel to 
Smith-Corona Group. In Smith-Corona the CAFC approved the ITA's 
ESP offset, which allowed deduction of indirect costs from foreign 
market value.83 In Consumer Products the court considered the validity 
of the regulatory cap, denominated the "ESP offset cap," which the 
ITA had placed on cost deductions.84 The ESP offset cap set a nu-
merical ceiling on these deductions equal to the amount of indirect 
costs deducted from the V.S. price side of the equation.85 
Silver Seiko, a Japanese manufacturer of imported typewriters, 
74 Id. at 1578; 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982). Smith-Corona also argued that the an-
tidumping duty statute establishes the fair value comparison on an "f.o.b. foreign pon" 
price basis. 713 F.2d at 1578; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (1982). According to Smith-Corona 
the ITA's regulation distorted this result. 713 F.2d at 1578. 
75 713 F.2d at 1578. The coun reasoned that because certain downward adjustments 
could be made in calculating exporter's sales price, but comparable downward adjust-
ments could not be made in calculating "purchase price," an anomaly would result-
higher dumping margins in the case of ESP transactions as compared to purchase price 
transactions. Consequently, the CAFC concluded that the ESP offset was created to 
smooth out this statutory rough spot. Id. 
76 Id. at 1578-79. 
77 Id. at 1579. "The statutory language ... is the only compelling evidence of record 
regarding the validity of the offset." Id. 
78Id. 
79 Id. "The offset does permit negation of one specific statutory adjustment to ex-
poner's sales price .... " Id. 
80Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Consumer Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at 1033. 
83 See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
84 Consumer Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at 1035-36. 
85 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1985). See Consumer Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at 1035-36. The 
sole question presented for the Federal Circuit's review was the validity of this regulatory 
cap. Id. at 1037. 
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challenged this regulation, arguing that section 773(a)(4)(B) of the 
1930 Tariff Act, as amended,86 required deduction of all selling ex-
penses, both direct and indirect, from foreign market value.87 Be-
cause the ESP offset cap limited foreign market selling expense 
deductions, Silver Seiko contended the fundamental goal of the AD 
law, a fair comparison of prices in U.S. and Japanese markets, was 
frustrated.88 
The Federal Circuit refused to adopt Silver Seiko's position, 
pointing out that Congress ratified the long-standing administrative 
practice of limiting deductions for differences in circumstances of 
sale to direct expenses such as credit terms, warranties, and differ-
ences in the level of trade, in the statute's legislative history.89 Con-
sequently, the court concluded that the ITA could not be required to 
make foreign market value adjustments attributable to indirect sell-
ing expenses.90 
After determining that the offset cap was consistent with the 
statute, the CAFC considered whether the regUlation establishing 
the ESP offset cap was "a reasonable exercise of the Secretary's dis-
cretion."91 The court determined that the agency's construction of 
the statute was entitled to great weight because it was charged with 
a~ministering the statute.92 The court added that the ITA's inter-
pretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpreta-
tion, but must be upheld if it has a reasonable basis in the statutory 
history.9!1 The Federal Circuit found that limiting the foreign market 
86 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B) (1982). 
87/d. 
88 753 F.2d at 1037. Silver Seiko based its argument that the statute requires deduc-
tion of all expenses of sale, direct as well as indirect, from foreign market value on the 
language of § 773(a)(4)(B). 
89 Id. at 1038. The coun noted only one exception to this rule: when exporter's sales 
price was used as the U.S. price, indirect expenses were allowed to be deducted as well. Id. 
90 Id. 
91 5« id. at 1038-39. 
92 The coun noted the following: 
As this coun recently stated in Melamine Chemicals, Inc. v. United States, 
732 F.2d 924, 928 (Fed. Cir. 1984): 
When the issue is the validity of a regulation issued under a statute 
an agency is charged with administering, it is well established that the 
agency's construction of the statute is entitled to great weight. . .. Simi-
larly, agency regulations are to be sustained unless unreasonable and 
plainly inconsistent with the statute, and -are to be held valid unless 
weighty reasons require otherwise. 
Id. at 1039 (citations omitted). 
The coun added that in determining whether a regulation is reasonable, considerable 
deference is to be accorded agency expertise, "the masters of the subject." Id. (quoting 
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979». 
9' The coun stated: 
Funher, it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's interpretation of 
the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which 
the coun views as the most reasonable. See, e.g., Fulman v. Uniud Staus, 434 
U.S. 528, 534-36 ... (1978) (regulation which had a "reasonable basis" in 
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value adjustment for indirect selling expenses to the amount of such 
expenses in the United States was not arbitrary.94 It reasoned that 
"any greater allowance could distort the computations in favor of 
foreign manufacturers"95 and the cap permitted a more efficient and 
expedited administrative process by shortening the investigation.96 
The Commerce Department, the court suggested, need only be con-
vinced that "valid" expenses meet or exceed the level of the cap.97 
Therefore, the CAFC concluded the regulation must be upheld be-
cause it was reasonable "[u]nder the limited standard of judicial re-
view applicable to this case."98 
A third case, Melamine Chemicals, Inc. v. United States,99 concerned 
the ITA's method of using currency exchange rates to calculate 
dumping margins. IOO Melamine Chemicals challenged the ITA's 
practice of using exchange rates from the quarter preceding an an-
tidumping duty investigation, 101 arguing that 31 U.S.C. section 
372102 requires use of exchange rates for the quarter in which the 
merchandise was exported. lOS 
The ITA's rationale for using the prior quarter's exchange rates 
was that, because the entire period under investigation was marked 
by significant exchange rate fluctuations, an exporter pricing its 
goods could not possibly predict the volatile exchange rate fluctua-
tions occuring within that quarter.l04 The ITA contended that fair-
ness to the hapless exporter dictated use of exchange rates 
applicable to the quarter in which the export sale occurred to deter-
mine whether a dumping margin existed. lOS The ITA . preliminarily 
found a 2.18 percent dumping margin.l06 It then applied the ex-
change rates in effect for the quarter in which the exporter set its 
prices, that being the quarter preceding the quarter in which the sale 
for exportation was made, to provide "a reasonable period of time to 
Id. 
the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer's challenge had "logical 
force"). 
94 Id. at 1040. 
951d. 
961d. 
971d. 
981d. 
99 732 F.2d at 924. 
100 Id. at 925. Set Comment, Antidumping-Application of Preceding 0mrttr's Foreign Ex· 
change Ratts to Fair Value Determination, 20 TEX. INT'L LJ. 425 (1985). 
101 732 F.2d at 925. 
102 This statute is now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5151 (1982). 
lOS 732 F.2d at 925·26. 
104 Id. at 931·32. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(b) (1985); Amendment of Final Determina-
tion, 45 Fed. Reg. 29,619, 29,620 (1980). 
105 732 F.2d at 933. The applicable quarter for export sales is determined by 31 
U.S.C. § 5151 (1982). 
106ld. 
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take into account" the exchange rate fluctuation. lO? Using this 
methodology, no dumping margin existed because the initial 2.18 
percent margin was solely attributable to a volatile exchange rate. lOS 
The CAFC applied the guidelines it used in its Smith-COTOnIJ 
Group and Consumer Products Division decisions to analyze the ITA's 
regulation. 109 First, the court noted that because the issue before it 
was the validity of a regulation issued pursuant to a statute which an 
agency administered, the agency's interpretation of the statute was 
entitled to great weight. 1 10 Second, the court held that such a regu-
lation must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsis-
tent with the enabling statute. 1 1 1 The CAFC acknowledged that no 
express authority for the ITA's "90-day lag" rule existed. It found, 
however, that "Commerce's duty to enforce fairly the antidumping 
laws by determining whetherLTFV [less-than-fair-value] sales are or 
are not occurring" constituted implicit authority and that "[a] finding 
of L TFV sales based on a margin resulting solely from a factor beyond 
the control of the exporter would be unreal, unreasonable, and un-
fair."112 In analyzing the 90-day lag rule, the court deferred entirely 
to the agency, deeming itself an "inappropriate institution ... to 
determine whether a 'reasonable period' would entail a lag of 
45 days, or 60 days, or 90 daYS."I1S The Federal Circuit deemed it 
sufficient that the ITA determined that the 90-day lag rule was rea-
sonable because there was no showing that the rule was 
unreasonable. 1 14 
m. Judicial Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretation 
The courts have frequently pronounced that interpretations of 
statutes that agencies are charged with administering are entitled to 
great deference. 115 The Supreme Court has endorsed this position, 
stating that to sustain an agency's interpretation of a statute, a court 
need not find an agency's interpretation to be the only reasonable 
one, nor need its interpretation be the result which the court itself 
107/d. 
lOS Id. 
109 Id. at 928. 
110 Id. 
I I lId. The court also noted the " 'tremendous deference to the expenise of ... Com-
merce in administering the antidumping law.''' Id. at 9S0 (quoting Smith-Corona Group. 
71S F.2d at 1582). 
112 Id. at 9SS (emphasis in original). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
I III See. t.g .• United States v. Clark. 454 U.S. 555. 565 (1982) ("Although not determi- . 
native. the construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to 
great deference. panicularly when that interpretation has been followed consistently over 
a long period of time."); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States. 07 U.S. 44S. 451 (1978); 
Udall v. Tallman. S80 U.S. I (1965); 5 K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 29.16. at 
400 (1978). 
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would have reached had the question first been presented in a judi-
cial proceeding. I 16 According to the Court, all that a reviewing court 
must find is that the agency's interpretation be "sufficiently reason-
able" to be accepted. 11 7 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council provides 
one of the more recent and most exhaustive treatments of this ques-
tion by the Supreme Court. I 18 In Chevron the Court applied a two-
step analysis. 1I9 The first inquiry is whether Congress has directly 
addressed the precise question at issue. 12o If it has, the regulation 
stands. 121 If, however, a court determines that Congress has not di-
rectly addressed the question, a second inquiry, whether the agency's 
regulation is based on a permissible construction of the statute, is 
necessary}22 In making this determination, the Court added that an 
agency's construction of a statute it administers deserves controlling 
weight. 12!1 The Court elaborated that two situations warrant further 
judicial deference. First, deference is height~ned if a "full under-
standing of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation ... 
depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the mat-
ters subject to agency regulations."124 Second, deference is height-
ened if the agency's interpretation involves. issues of considerable 
public controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct any mis-
perception of its statutory objectives.125 
Despite the substantial deference that the Supreme Court has 
established for agency interpretations of statutes, it has qualified its 
rather sweeping statements with the caveat that the agency's con-
struction is "not determinative."126 Although the shibboleth of 
"agency expertise" has been often invoked to bolster an agency's in-
terpretation of statutes, the Court has warned that so-called "expert 
116 See, e.g., Zenith Radio, 437 U.S. at 450. 
117 Id.; Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. I, 10 (1976). 
118 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). 
119 Id. at 2781 ("When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions.") Id. Su R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO Be P. 
VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PROCESS § 7.7, at 405-07 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 
PIERCE, SHAPIRO Be VERKUIL]. 
120 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82. "First, always, is the question whether Congress had di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress." Id. (footnote omitted). 
121 Id. at 2782 n.9. 
122 Id. at 2782. "[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute." Id. (footnote omitted). 
12!1 [d. at 2782. . 
124 Id. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 382 (1980); United States v. Rutherford, 
442 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1978). 
125 104 S. Ct. at 2782-83. 
126 Clark, 454 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2869 (1983); 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 115, 
§ 29.16, at 399. 
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discretion" has its limits: "Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the 
administrative process, but unless we make the requirements for ad-
ministrative action strict and demanding, expertise, the strength of 
modern government, can become a monster which rules with no 
practical limits on its discretion."127 Nonetheless, it would probably 
be an error to conclude that these quotations are "the law."128 The 
Supreme Court has vacillated in its deferential stance towards agency 
expertise. As Professor Kenneth Culp Davis aptly observes: "The 
accurate statement is that such quotations are sometimes the law and 
sometimes not. In each case, the Supreme Court has discretion to 
adopt or to reject the quotations, and the choice it makes usually 
depends on which way it wants to resolve the substantive 
question."129 
Matters are also complicated, in Davis' view, by the fact that def-
erence to an agency's interpretation of law is not generally men-
tioned in Supreme Court opinions which reject agency 
interpretations. ISO Although Davis suggests that" '[d]eference' ... 
[is] useful when the Court is in doubt about the interpretation but is 
satisfied to let the agency's decision stand,"ISI he concludes that the 
Court substitutes its own judgment for agency judgment more fre-
quently than it defers, even in cases when "the question of interpre-
tation involves policymaking within the agency's specialized 
area." IS2 
Matters are further complicated because several areas of admin-
istrative regulation have developed their own specialized body of de-
cisional . authority regarding judicial deference. ISS As one 
commentator noted, "the intensity and character of judicial review 
will vary from one field to the next, depending on the court's percep-
tions about the specific legislative mandate, the makeup of the 
agency, [and] the nature of the challenged program."IM 
Given the vagaries of judicial review in the administrative con-
text, a cynic would conclude that judges are result oriented, deciding 
127 Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 571 U.S. 156, 167 (1962) (quoting New 
York v. United States, 542 U.S. 882, 884 (1951) (Douglas,J., dissenting». 
128 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 115, § 29.16, at 405. See PIERCE, SHAPIRO Be VERKUIL, supra 
note 119, at §§ 7.4, 7.6, 7.8. 
129 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 115, § 29.16, at 405. 
ISO Id. 
lSI Id. 
IS2 Id. 
133 Levin, Federal Scope-oJ-RnMw Standards: A Preliminary Restatement, 57 AD. L. REv. 95, 
97 (1985) "[E]very substantive field of regulation develops its own body of case law anicu-
lating the degree of deference to be afforded to various administrative determinations in 
that area." Id. at 97. 5«, e.g., Boudreau, To Defer or Not To Defer: The 0Jestionfor the D.C. 
Circuit in RnMwing FCC Decisions, 56 FED. COM. LJ. 295 (1984) (using the FCC as an exam-
ple of administrative regulation and review of agency decisionmaking). S« generally 
Weaver,}vdici4llfIIn'/I"tation of Administmtive Regulations: The Defmnct Rule, 45 U. PnT. L 
REv. 587 (1984). 
154 Levin, supra note 1S5, at 97. 
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. cases primarily on their individual policy predilections. Cynics 
notwithstanding, however, "[t]he deference owed to an expert tribu-
nal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia."ls5 Judges un-
questionably take their roles seriously. This is not to deny that 
judges enter the arena carrying their own set of political and ideolog-
ical baggage. While their review may be highly subjective, courts still 
possess legitimate independence when reviewing agency statutory 
interpretations. ls6 The Supreme Court has endorsed this independ-
entjudgment principle: "When an agency's decision is premised on 
its understanding of a specific congressional intent ... it engages in 
the quintessential judicial function of deciding what a statute means. 
In that case, the agency's interpretation may be influential, but it 
cannot bind a court."IS7 
How does section 516A of the Act lS8 measure up against this 
analytical framework? This question is addressed in the following 
part of this article. 
IV. Judicial Review Under the TAA 
In the author's view, the scope of judicial review provided in sec-
tion 516A(a)(2)IS9 is so vague as to be devoid of any meaningful 
standards. The statute's proviso that an agency's decision must be 
upheld unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, or is other-
wise not in accordance with law,140 tells reviewing courts nothing of 
the process to be followed; it merely states conclusions. 
Although the scope of review standards in section 516A(a)(2) 
may be inadequate, increasing the intensity of review might yield a 
more meaningful judicial review process. 141 Three levels of intensity 
of review have been identified. 142 The first has been termed a "kid 
185 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261. 
271 (1968). 
186 As noted by Justice Frankfurter in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 
(1951): 
A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for 
certitude but cannot assure certainty of application. Some scope for judicial 
discretion in applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual 
process of judging or by using the formula as an instrument of futile 
casuistry. 
[d. at 488-89. 
187 BATF v. FLRA, 104 S. Ct. 439, 445 n.8 (1983). See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 
118 (1978) (the courts are "final authorities on issues· of statutory construction"). 
188 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982). See Note, supra note 10. 
189 19 U.S.C. § 1561a(a)(2) (1982). 
140 [d. 
141 See Comment, Administrative Law-Judicial RnIirw of Agency Action: Motor Vehicle Man-
ufacturers Association v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co., 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 884, 
898 (1984). 
142 Pierce Be Shapiro, Political andJudicial RnIirw of Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1175, 
1186-91 (1981). 
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gloves" approach. 14S As the name implies, this standard is highly 
deferential to agency action. 144 A second, more intense level of re-
view is the "adequate consideration" test. 14S Under this test, a court 
will invalidate an agency's action when it fails to follow or fully con-
sider factors and goals set out in the enabling legislation. 146 The 
third and most intensive level of judicial scrutiny is the "hard look" 
test. 14? Under this test, the court's review is more probing and the 
degree of deference is at its lowest. 148 Judges most often employ the 
"hard look" test when the agency's action appears inconsistent with 
its statutory mandate. 149 In addition, this test may be employed 
when the issue before the reviewing court is of great public impor-
tance. ISO As the following discussion demonstrates, little justifica-
tion exists for any but the lowest degree of judicial deference in cases 
involving Federal. Circuit review of ITA interpretations of the an-
tidumping duty law.lsi . 
The judicially vigilant "hard look" test is the most appropriate 
standard for Federal Circuit review of ITA antidumping law determi-
nations for two reasons. First, Congress referred repeatedly to the 
"specialized expertise" of the Court of International Trade and the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the 1980 Customs Courts 
Act's legislative history.ls2 This judicial expertise extends to all civil 
actions arising from import transactions. l5S Given Congress' explicit 
acknowledgement of the CAFC's special expertise in international 
trade matters, it is questionable whether the CAFC should ever defer 
145 [d. at 1188-89; Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061, 1072 (5th Cir. 1975), em. 
dmied sub nom. California Co. v. FPC, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
144 Pierce Be Shapiro, supra note 142, at 1188-89. 
145 [d. at 1190-91. 
146 [d. 
147 [d. at 1187-88. 
148 /d. This level of review has been described as review "with vigilance." Greater 
Boston Television Co. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), en't. dmied, 403 U.S. 
925 (1971). 
149 Pierce Be Shapiro. supra note 142, at 1187-88 Be n.76. 
ISO [d. at 1188 n.76. 
151 As commentators have poiilted out, no matter how much deference is shown, a 
coun never actually affirms an agency interpretation of a statutory provision without first 
independently analyzing it and its legislative history. If the court finds a conflict, it 
reverses under any standard of review. Woodward Be Levin, In Defense of Defmnce: Judicial 
Review of Agency Action, 31 AD. L. REV. 329, 332-55 (1979); PIERCE, SHAPIRO Be VERKUIL, 
supra note 119, at 576-77. 
152 H.R. REP. No. 1255, supra note 5, at 20. "The Customs Courts Act of 1980 creates 
a comprehensive system of judicial review of civil actions arising from import transactions, 
utilizing the specialized expenise of the United States Customs Coun [the predecessor 
coun of the Coun of International Trade] and the United States Coun of Customs and 
Patent Appeals [one of the two couns which were merged to form the CAFC]." [d. The 
House Repon also referred to the major goals of the. Customs Couns Act, one of which 
was "[t]he re-emphasis and clarification of Congress' intent that the expenise [of the CIT 
and CAFC] be exclusively utilized in the resolution of conflicts and disputes arising out of 
the tariff and international trade laws .... " Id. at 28. 
1&5 [d. at 20. 
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to the ITA in cases involving statutory construction of the antidump-
ing duty law. While the Federal Circuit has referred to the ITA as 
the "master" of the AD lawl54 and has deferred to the agency on that 
basis,155 this deference is arguably an instance of the tail wagging the 
dog because of the role the Federal Circuit has been assigned by the 
Customs Courts Act. Second, the "hard look" test should be em-
ployed because every AD determination reached by the ITA touches 
upon a question of public importance to international trade involv-
ing the world's largest economic power. 156 
V. CAFC Deference to the ITA 
In Smith-Corona Group the Federal Circuit had before it a paradig-
matic case of an agency interpreting the statute which it was en-
trusted with administering. 157 The case did not involve any fact 
findings or other evidentiary matters which informed the ITA's inter-
pretation of the statute. 15S The CAFC applied a two-step inquiry: 
"whether the regulations are a proper exercise of the [Commerce] 
Secretary's authority and [whether the regulations] are reason-
able."159 It steered clear of the "hard look" test, applying instead a 
standard of review more akin to the "adequate consideration" 
test. ISO The CAFC should have applied the "hard look" test em-
ployed by reviewing courts when the issue is either technical or of 
critical importance, or when the agency's action appears inconsistent 
with its statutory mandate. 161 International trade issues meet these 
two criteria,162 and the CAFC is as well positioned as the ITA to 
interpret the T AA because of its specialized expertise in interna-
tional trade matters,16S and given the exclusivity of its appellate ju-
risdiction over T AA cases.I64 
The court conceded that the ITA's interpretation of the TAA 
was somewhat inconsistent with the Act and its legislative history, 165 
noting that Congress had expressed dissatisfaction with the use of 
154 Consumer Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at 1039. 
155 [d. at 1039-40. 
156 As stated by the court in this connection in Smith-Corona Group: "The number of 
factors involved, complicated by the difficulty in quantification of these factors and the 
foreign policy repercussions of a dumping detennination, makes the enforcement of the 
antidumping law a difficult and supremely delicate endeavor." 713 F.2d at 1571. 
157 [d. at 1575. 
158 See id. at 1575-77. 
159 [d. at 1575. The court also relied upon the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 706 (1982), and the Supreme Court's opinion in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United 
States, 437 U.S. 443, 450-51 (1978). [d. at 1575 n.18. 
160 713 F.2d at 1575. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text. 
161 See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. 
16S See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text. 
164 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1982). 
165 715 F.2d at 1575-76. 
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cost, as opposed to value and price, in determining foreign market 
value}66 The CAFC nevertheless upheld the ITA's regulation em-
ploying cost criteria to compute allowances for differences in circum-
stances of sale. 167 The court also conceded that the ESP offset was 
"inconsistent with the general [statutory] requirement of a direct re-
lation"l68 between circumstances of sale and the transaction under 
investigation, noting that the statute repeatedly refers to "foreign 
market value, as if there were only one foreign market value under 
consideration."169 The court nonetheless sanctioned the ITA's use 
of criteria that negated the express adjustment to exporters' sales 
price authorized by the T AA.170 
Had the "hard look" test been employed in this case, the CAFC 
should not have upheld either regulation. Because the statute and 
legislative history clearly reject the use of cost criteria in determining 
differences in circumstances of sale,171 the court should have invali-
dated this regulation under a "hard look" test. The ESP offset, 
which the ITA clearly fashioned out of whole cloth in contravention 
of the Act, should also have been invalidated. The T AA does not 
authorize use of two different foreign market value computations de-
pending on whether U.S. price was based on purchase price or ex-
porter's sales price. 172 To the contrary, Congress expressly 
provided that adjustments to foreign market value be based solely on 
direct costS.17S Because the ESP offsetl7• flouts this explicit congres-
sional directive by allowing an offset to foreign market value based 
on indirect costs or expenses,175 the ITA's regulation would have 
been unacceptable under the close scrutiny of "hard look" analysis. 
Id. 
In Consumer . Products Division, SCM Corp. the court held that the 
166 [d. at 1576. 
167 [d. at 1577. 
168 [d. at 1578. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 1579. The coun stated: 
Although the statute expressly requires a direct relationship between the dif-
ferences in circumstances of sale and adjustments to foreign market value, 
we cannot conclude that the' administering authority acted either beyond its 
authority or unreasonably in promulgating the offset. The offset does permit 
negation of one specific statutory adjustment to exponer's sales price, but 
does so to achieve a broader statutory purpose otherwise frustrated because 
of the alternative statutory methods of computing United States price. 
171 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 167S, 1677a, 1677b(a)(4) (1982); S. REp. No. 249, supra note 4, at 
6O,9S-96. To the contrary, the Act and its legislative history indicate that price or value 
criteria should be used. Id.; Smith-Curona Group, 71S F.2d at 1577. 
172 Set 19 U.S.C. §§ 167S, 1677b (1982). 
175 Id. § I 677b(a)(4). 
174 Stt 19C.F.R. § S5S.15(c) (1985). Set Smith-Corona Group, 7lS F.2d at 1578. 
175 Set H.R. REp. No. S17, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1979). "[T]he Committee intends 
that adjustments [to foreign market value] should be permitted if they are reasonably iden-
tifiable, quantifiable, and directly related to the sales under consideration .... " Id. (empha-
sis added). 
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ESP offset cap was a reasonable exercise of the Secretary's discre-
tion,176 exhibiting its deference to agency expertise with such 
phrases as "great weight" 177 and "considerable deference"17s to the 
" 'masters of the subject.' "179 In the most cursory of analyses, the 
CAFC held that limiting the adjustment for indirect selling expenses 
on the Japanese foreign market value side of the antidumping duty 
equation to the amount allowed against the exporter's sales price, 
the U.S. price, was not arbitrary. The court stated that "any greater 
allowance could distort the computations in favor of foreign manu-
facturers."lso The court justified validating the ESP offset cap be-
cause it aided in efficient administration of the law.Isl The cap 
achieved this result by freeing the agency from the task of calculating 
and investigating indirect expenses on the foreign market side of the 
ledger as soon as those expenses equalled comparable expenses on 
the U.S. price side of the ledger. 
While administrative efficiency may be promoted under the ESP 
offset cap, rational agency action clearly is not. It makes no more 
sense to place a ceiling on indirect selling expenses on the U.S. price 
side of the equation· than it does to place the ceiling on the foreign 
market value side. Indeed, the ESP offset cap will skew the calcula-
tions in. favor of higher dumping margins in cases in which indirect 
expenses connected with foreign market value exceed the expenses 
associated with U.S. price. 
The analysis the CAFC employed in the preceding two cases is 
virtually identical to that utilized in Melamine Chemicals, Inc. IS2 The 
CAFC stated that agency regulations must be sustained unless 
"plainly inconsistent with the statute"ISS or "weighty reasons re-
quire otherwise."ls4 In upholding the 90-day lag rule, the Federal 
Circuit emphasized the regulation's salutary purpose of enabling the 
ITA to disregard temporary exchange rate fluctuations. ISS While it 
is difficult to quarrel with this goal, the source of ITA authority for 
promulgating the regulation is unclear. The CAFC essentially im-
plied agency authority to issue the exchange rate regulation from the 
176 Consumer Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at 1039. 
177 Id. (quoting Melamine Chems., Inc., 732 F.2d at 928). 
178/d. 
179 Id. (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 
(1979». In addition, the court observed: "it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's 
interpretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one 
which the court views as the most reasonable." 753 F.2d at 1039 (emphasis in original). 
180 Id. at 1040. 
181 Id. "[T]he cap does aid in efficient administration and assists the agency in meet· 
ing the exigencies of times and staff limitations." Id. 
182 Compare Smith.Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1575; and Consumer Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at 
1036; with Melamine Chems., Inc., 732 F.2d at 928. 
18S Melamine Chems., Inc., 732 F.2d at 928. 
184 Id. 
1851d. 
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TAA's legislative history}86 The court's conclusion is highly sus-
pect. Although there are broad statements within the legislative his-
tory suggesting that the ITA should have some flexibility in·· 
administering the law, 187 there is absolutely no indication that Con-
gress knew of or acquiesced in this regulation when it enacted the 
T AA. In spite of the absence of clear Congressional support for this 
regulation, however, its appeal is undeniable. It is arguably a fair 
solution to the problem of apparent price differences between na-
tional markets created by floating exchange rates and not by 
dumping. 
When Congress has not addressed a particular issue, it is incum-
bent upon an agency to discern as nearly as possible what Congress 
would have done had it considered the problem.188 Under this latter 
analysis, it is difficult to conclude that the CAFC was far off the mark 
in upholding the exchange rate regulation. If the Federal Circuit is 
to be faulted in Melamine Chemical.5, Inc., it is for its lack of candor in 
acknowledging that Congress simply had not addressed the issue. 
Using this admission as the starting point for analysis, the adminis-
tering agency was certainly no better placed than the court to "flesh 
out" the statute. Filling in the interstices-"fleshing out"-is 
quintessentially, and ultimately, a judicial function. 189 
VI. The CAFC and Deference-Conclusion 
In each of the three cases discussed in this article, the Federal 
Circuit deferred too much to the ITA. In Smith-Corona Group and 
Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. Congress had enacted a statu-
tory provision covering the subject matter, supplemented by legisla-
tive history. In light of these Congressional guidelines, the 
overriding importance of international trade, and the CAFC's exclu-
sive, specialized jurisdiction over antidumping duty appeals, the Fed-
eral Circuit should have closely scrutinized the ITA's 
determinations, rather than deferring to the agency as the purported 
"master" of the antidumping duty law. 
In Melamine Chemical.5, [nco Congress was silent on the question of 
exchange rates in fair value investigations. Nevertheless, it was the 
CAFC's prerogative as the responsible reviewing court for all an-
tidumping duty appeals to fill in this gap. 
186 Id. at 930.31. 
187 Stt, t.g., H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1979); S. REP. No. 249, supra 
note 4, at 49, 96. 
188 Set, t.g., Montana Power Co. v. FPC, 445 F.2d at 739, 746-47 (D.C. Cir. 1970), em. 
denied, 400 U.S. 1013 (1971); District of Columbia v. Orleans, 406 F.2d 957, 958 (D.C. Cir. 
1968). 
189 FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 226 (1968); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. ICC, 
686 F.2d 1,5-6 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Hiatt Grain Be Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 602 F.2d 929, 934 
(lOth Cir. 1979), ctrl. cImied,444 U.S. 1073 (1980); supra note 137. 
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It must be stressed that the Federal Circuit is a special federal 
court. No other appellate court hears antidumping duty appeals. 
Given the CAFC's exclusive appellate jurisdiction, it can be fairly as-
sumed that the judges of the Federal Circuit have acquired a level of 
expertise on a par with the ITA, at least when statutory construction 
and interpretation are involved. Any claim of "agency expertise" as 
a basis for heightening judicial deference to ITA statutory interpre-
tations should be viewed skeptically. 
In the final analysis, and in fairness to the Federal Circuit, the 
jUdiciary is called upon to "steer a course between the Scylla of un-
due deference and the Charybdis of too broad review."190 Neverthe-
less, while "[j]udicial review is not to be exercised with the zeal of a 
pedantic schoolmaster who grades papers for a single correct an-
swer,"191 neither is a court to be a judicial "rubber stamp."192 The 
Federal Circuit should take special notice of this admonition because 
Congress has identified the court as possessing special expertise in 
the field of international trade law. 
190 Schwanz, Administrative Law Cases During 1983, !J6 AD. L. REV. 91, III (1984). 
191 Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 694 F.2d !J78, !J8!J (5th Cir. 1982), 
em. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2160 (1984). 
192 United States v. Gamer, 767 F.2d 104, 116 (5th Cir. 1985). 
